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1Firm-asymmetry and strategic outsourcing
1. Introduction
Outsourcing occurs in several industries such as aviation, automobiles, computers and
electronics. Among some well-known cases, consider the aircraft giant Boeing, which
outsources products of over 34000 components to different manufacturers for the production
of 747 passenger aircraft. It is particularly interesting to note that Boeing signed agreements
with a Japanese consortium1 whose costs are just as high as or higher than Boeing. According
to the agreements, Boeing would purchase from them the 767-X fuselage during the 1990s,
and then wings, together with related research and development during the 2000s (Chen, 2011).
In computer industry Sun purchases about 75% of components from other companies. It is
also common that outsourcing activities sometimes take place in a manner where the arch
rivals purchases from common suppliers. For example, in 2004, Shanghai Automotive
Industry Corporation (SAIC) manufactured for Volkswagen and GM.2 In the United States,
more than 60% of auto parts suppliers make components for the big three car manufacturers,
viz., GM, Chrysler and Ford (Alexandrov, 2010). Spirit AeroSystems Inc., the world’s largest
first-tier aerostructures manufacturer and the former Boeing Commercial Airplanes site that
was divested from Boeing in 2005, is a supplier of fuselage sections for both Boeing and
Airbus3.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the sourcing decision (i.e., producing in-house or
1 It is composed of the three biggest industrial giants of Japan: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy
Industries LTD, and Fuji Heavy Industries (Chen, 2011).
2 See: https://hbr.org/2006/09/when-your-contract-manufacturer-becomes-your-competitor.
3 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit_AeroSystems.
2purchasing from an outside supplier) may simply be a matter of choosing the least cost
alternative by comparing internal production costs with the prices charged by the independent
suppliers.4 However, in today’s world where strategic interactions among the final goods
producers are evident, we show that a final goods producer may outsource input production
to an outside supplier even if the final goods producer possesses a superior input-production
technology compared to the outside supplier. The final goods producer with a superior input-
production technology does this in order to get a strategic advantage in the final goods market.
We consider a situation where there are three firms. There is a final goods producer, which
can produce both the final good and a critical input required to produce the final good. There
is another final goods producer, which cannot produce the input but may purchase it from an
outside input supplier that is technologically inferior compared to the final goods producer
producing the input. We show in this framework that outsourcing by the final goods producer,
which is most capable of producing the input, increases outside input supplier’s input demand,
which, in turn, increases the input price for both final goods producers. However, if the final
goods producer with the input-production technology has a significantly superior technology
to produce the final good compared to the final goods producer without the input-production
technology, the burden of a higher input price is significantly more on the final goods producer
without input-production technology compared to the other final goods producer, which
increases the competitive advantage of the final goods producer with the input-production
technology and creates the incentive for outsourcing. Although this type of strategic
4 The sourcing decision can be far more complex in reality. The literature reveals many strategic elements
which may play a pivotal role in firms’ sourcing decisions. For example, sourcing decision can be influenced
by fears of supplier hold-up, concerns about leakage of proprietary information, the need to ensure timely and
reliable supply of high-quality inputs, prospective gains from cultivating long term alliances with suppliers,
strategic competitive considerations and anti-competitive purpose.
3outsourcing to raise the rival’s cost5 is profitable for the final goods producer with the input-
production technology, it may hurt the consumers and the society by increasing the input cost
for the final goods producers. Thus, our paper, considering outsourcing in a closed economy,
complements the literature showing a growing concern about the negative welfare effects of
international outsourcing (Chen et al., 2004, Marjit and Mukherjee, 2008 and Mukherjee and
Tsai, 2010).
Our paper also contributes to the existing literature showing the effects of outsourcing
on innovation (Marjit and Mukherjee, 2008, Chen and Sen, 2010 and Beladi et al., 2012).
Unlike the existing papers, which consider innovation to improve efficiency in final goods
production, we consider and compare the welfare effects of innovation to improve efficiency
in input production and final goods production. We show that the welfare effects of innovation
for improving input production are significantly different to that of the final goods production.
An increase in cost efficiency in input production will increase consumer surplus if it induces
the final goods producer with the input-production technology to change its strategy from
outsourcing to in-house input production. However, an increase in efficiency in final goods
production may reduce consumer surplus if it induces the final goods producer with the input-
production technology to change its strategy from in-house input production to outsourcing.
While an increase in cost efficiency in input production will increase (may decrease) social
welfare by inducing the final goods producer with the input-production technology to change
its strategy from outsourcing to in-house input production, an increase in efficiency in final
5 One may refer to Salop and Scheffman (1987) and Mason (2002) for earlier work on raising rival’s cost
strategy.
4goods production may decrease (increase) social welfare by inducing the final goods producer
with the input-production technology to change its strategy from in-house input production to
outsourcing if its efficiency in processing input to the final good is (not) high enough to that
of the final goods producer with no input-production technology.
There is a growing literature showing how outsourcing by a final good producer increases
its competitiveness compared to the competitors by raising the input prices (Arya et al., 2008
and Beladi and Marjit, 2012). However, unlike our paper, outsourcing occurs in those papers
provided the independent input supplier possesses a better technology compared to the input
producing final goods producer. Chen (2011) and Kabiraj and Sinha (2014 and 2016) show
the incentive for outsourcing by a final goods producer that has a better input-production
technology than the independent input supplier. However, the reasons for outsourcing in those
papers are different from ours. While entry-deterrence is the motive in Chen (2011), the
benefit from technology transfer is the driving force for outsourcing in Kabiraj and Sinha
(2014 and 2016).6 In contrast, the benefit from raising rival’s cost is the main motive for
outsourcing in our paper.
It may be worth noting that although we consider that the independent input supplier and
the final goods producers are in the same country, outsourcing in our paper occurs even if the
independent input supplier is from a different country. Thus, our paper also complements the
literature on international outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999, Glass and Saggi, 2001,
Grossman and Helpman, 2002 and 2003, Antràs and Helpman, 2004, Jones, 2005 and Marjit
6 For other interesting papers on strategic outsourcing, see Shy and Stenbacka (2003) and Buehler and Haucap
(2006).
5and Mukherjee, 2008). However, unlike these papers, raising rival’s cost is the motive for
outsourcing in our paper.
Our paper highlights the issue that the act of outsourcing raises some serious competitive
concerns because of its negative impact on consumer surplus and social welfare. It shows the
incentive for raising rivals cost in the starkest way despite having more efficient production
method available in-house for input production. Thus, our analysis raises several important
questions both for the policy makers and for future empirical analysis. Are there significant
differences in input production technologies between an outsourcing firm and the input
producers? Are the technological leaders having larger market shares choose outsourcing to
throttle competition from technologically weak rivals? Most industries are abuzz with anti-
competitive practices and the competition authorities typically believe that outsourcing
activities are for minimizing the cost of production rather than raising rival costs. In view of
our finding, the competition authorities must consider the outsourcing activities more
carefully and especially, where the technology leaders are engaged in outsourcing activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
shows the results. Section 3 discusses the implications of cost reducing innovation, either in
the final good production or in input production, on the outsourcing decision of the firm and
social welfare. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model and the results
Assume that there are two final goods producers, producing a homogeneous product like
Cournot duopolists. One of them, called firm 1, can produce a critical input, which is required
for the final good, and assume that the marginal cost of input production by firm 1 is .ܿ The
6other one, called firm 2, cannot produce this critical input and it always purchases this critical
input from the input market. There is an outside input supplier, firm I, who can produce this
critical input at a constant marginal cost .݀
We assume that only this input is required for the final good, and firm 1 is more efficient
in processing the input to final good compared to firm 2. Assume that firm 1 requires ߣ (0 <
ߣ< 1) units of the input to produce 1 unit of the final good, while firm 2 requires 1 unit of
the input to produce 1 unit of the final good.
We assume that the inverse market demand function for the final good is ܲ = 1 − ݍ,
where ܲ is the price and ݍ is the total output. To make our following analysis meaningful
for any value of ߣ, we also assume 0 ≤ ܿ< 1.
We consider the following four-stage game. At stage 1, firm 1 decides whether to produce
the input in-house or to outsource the input from the input market where firm I would be sole
seller. At stage 2, in case of in-house production decision, firm 1 decides whether to enter the
input market to compete with firm I or not. Otherwise, the game proceeds to stage 3. At stage
3, in case of in-house production decision and subsequent entry by firm 1, there will be
competition in the input market between firm 1 and firm I.7 Otherwise, firm I determines its
input price, w, as a monopoly input producer. At stage 4, firms 1 and 2 produce the final goods
like Cournot duopolists. The profits are realized. We solve the game through backward
induction.
In order to guarantee that firms 1 and 2 always produce the final good, irrespective of the
outsourcing decision of firm 1, we restrict the parameter values for our analysis to satisfy the
7 We will consider both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the input market.
7following two assumptions:
A1: ଶௗିଵ
ఒ
< ܿ< ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
A2: ݀ < ଶିହఒାହఒమ
ଶ(ଶିఒ)(ଵିఒାఒమ)
The assumption A1 is the condition under which firms 1 and 2 produce the final good if firm
1 produces the input in-house, while the assumption A2 guarantees that firms 1 and 2 produce
the final good when firm 1 outsources its input to firm I. The exact nature of these parameter
restrictions would be clear once we derive the profit expressions later. The assumption A2
also implies that ݀ < 1 holds under 0 < ߣ< 1.
2.1. In-house production
If firm 1 decides to produce the input in-house at stage 1, there are two options for firm 1 at
stage 2. One is to stay out of the input market, i.e., firm 1 does not sell any input to firm 2.
The other is to enter the input market and compete with firm I.
2.1.1. No selling of inputs by firm 1
If firm 1 stays out of the input market at stage 2, given the input price, ݓ ெ , charged by firm
I, the profits of firms 1 and 2 at stage 4 are as follows:
ߨଵ
ெ = (1 − ݍଵெ − ݍଶெ − ܿߣ )ݍଵெ ߨଶெ = (1 − ݍଵெ − ݍଶெ − ݓ ெ )ݍଶெ ,
where ݍ௜ is the output of firm ݅ (݅= 1,2). The superscript ܯ denotes the situation of in-
house production and no selling of inputs by firm 1.
We can get the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 as:
ݍଵ
ெ = ଵିଶఒ௖ା௪ ಾ
ଷ
ݍଶ
ெ = ଵାఒ௖ି ଶ௪ ಾ
ଷ
8At stage 3, firm I faces demand for input only from firm 2, and it is equal to ݍଶெ =
ଵାఒ௖ି ଶ௪ ಾ
ଷ
. Given this input demand, firm I maximizes its profit ߨூெ by choosing the input
price ݓ ெ , i.e.,max
௪ ಾ
ߨூ
ெ = max
௪ ಾ
൫௪ ಾ ିௗ൯൫ଵାఒ௖ି ଶ௪ ಾ ൯
ଷ
.
This yields the equilibrium input price set by firm I as ݓ ெ = ଵାఒ௖ାଶௗ
ସ
.
Standard calculation shows that the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2, the equilibrium
profits of the firms and the equilibrium consumer surplus under in-house input production and
no selling of inputs by firm 1 are as follows:
ݍଵ
ெ = ହି଻ఒ௖ାଶௗ
ଵଶ
ݍଶ
ெ = ଵାఒ௖ି ଶௗ
଺
ߨଵ
ெ = (ହି଻ఒ௖ାଶௗ)మ
ଵସସ
ߨଶ
ெ = (ଵାఒ௖ି ଶௗ)మ
ଷ଺
ߨூ
ெ = (ଵାఒ௖ି ଶௗ)మ
ଶସ
ܥܵெ = (଻ିହఒ௖ି ଶௗ)మ
ଶ଼଼
.
The corresponding social welfare is
ܹ ெ = ߨଵெ + ߨଶெ + ߨூெ + ܥܵெ = ଵଵଽି ଵ଻଴ఒ௖ାଵସଷఒమ௖మିଵଵ଺ఒ௖ௗି଺଼ௗାଽଶௗమଶ଼଼ .
2.1.2. Selling of inputs by firm 1
If firm 1 enters the input market at stage 2, it may compete with firm I à la Cournot or Bertrand.
2.1.2.1. Cournot competition in the input market
Suppose firm 1 competes à la Cournot with firm I at stage 3 after it enters the input market at
stage 2. Given the input price, ݓ ஼, paid by firm 2, the profits of firms 1 and 2 at stage 4 are
as follows:
ߨଵ
஼ = (1 − ݍଵ஼ − ݍଶ஼ − ܿߣ )ݍଵ஼ + (ݓ ஼ − )ܿݔଵ஼ ߨଶ஼ = (1 − ݍଵ஼ − ݍଶ஼ − ݓ ஼)ݍଶ஼,
where ݔଵ஼ (≥ 0) is the quantity of inputs sold by firm 1 in the input market. The superscript
9ܥ denotes the situation of in-house production by firm 1 and Cournot competition in the input
market.
We can get the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 as:
ݍଵ
஼ = ଵିଶఒ௖ା௪ ಴
ଷ
ݍଶ
஼ = ଵାఒ௖ି ଶ௪ ಴
ଷ
At stage 3, firm 1 and firm I face the demand for input from firm 2, and it is equal to
ݔଵ
஼ + ݔூ஼ = ݍଶ஼ = ଵାఒ௖ି ଶ௪ ಴ଷ , where ݔூ஼ (≥ 0) is the quantity of inputs sold by firm I. Hence,
the inverse demand function for input is ݓ ஼ = ଵାఒ௖ି ଷ൫௫భ಴ା௫಺಴൯
ଶ
. Given this inverse demand
function for input, firm 1 maximizes its profit ߨଵ஼ by choosing ݔଵ஼, i.e.,max
௫భ
಴
ߨଵ
஼ = max
௫భ
಴
ଵൣିఒ௖ି ൫௫భ
಴ା௫಺
಴൯൧
మ
ସ
+ ଵൣାఒ௖ି ଷ൫௫భ಴ା௫಺಴൯൧௫భ಴
ଶ
.
We get డగభ
಴
డ௫భ
಴ = ଶ(ఒିଵ)௖ି ହ௫భ಴ିଶ௫಺಴ଶ < 0, indicating that it is optimal for firm 1 to choose ݔଵ஼ = 0.
In other words, firm 1 would not have incentive to compete à la Cournot with firm I. The
intuition is as follows. Although selling inputs to firm 2 by firm 1 increases its profit from the
input market, the input price paid by its rival (firm 2) falls, which reduces firm 1’s profit from
the final goods market, and overall firm 1 loses by participating in the input market under
quantity competition.
2.1.2.2. Bertrand competition in the input market
Obviously, firm 1 has no incentive to enter the input market at stage 2 if competition between
firm 1 and firm I is characterized by Bertrand competition, when its marginal cost of input
production is not less than that of firm I. So, firm 1 may compete with firm I à la Bertrand in
the input market only for ܿ< .݀
The Bertrand competition in the input market makes firm 2 purchase all of its inputs from
10
firm 1 at a limiting input price, ݓ ஻ = ݀ under ܿ< .݀ Accordingly, the profits of firms 1 and
2 at stage 4 are as follows:
ߨଵ
஻ = (1 − ݍଵ஻ − ݍଶ஻ − ܿߣ )ݍଵ஻ + (݀− )ܿݍଶ஻ ߨଶ஻ = (1 − ݍଵ஻ − ݍଶ஻ − ݀)ݍଶ஻
The superscript ܤ denotes the situation of in-house production by firm 1 and Bertrand
competition in the input market.
We get the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 as ݍଵ஻ = ଵିଶఒ௖ାௗଷ and ݍଶ஻ = ଵାఒ௖ି ଶௗଷ
respectively. Thus, the profit of firm 1 in this situation is ߨଵ஻ = (ଵିଶఒ௖ାௗ)మଽ + (ௗି௖)(ଵାఒ௖ି ଶௗ)ଷ .
Comparing ߨଵெ with ߨଵ஻ under c d , we get that ߨଵெ ⋛ ߨଵ஻ if ܿ⋛
ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
, implying
that firm 1 will enter the input market and compete with firm I à la Bertrand only for ܿ<
ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
if it decides to produce inputs in-house. In other words, if firm 1 produces the inputs
in-house, it will compete with firm I à la Bertrand for ܯܽݔቂ0, ଶௗିଵ
ఒ
ቃ< ܿ< ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ,
and will not sell its input to firm 2 for ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ≤ ܿ< ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃ. Accordingly, the
equilibrium outcomes under in-house input production for ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ≤ ܿ<
ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃhave been shown in subsection 2.1.1.8
2.2. Outsourcing
If firm 1 decides to outsource its input production to firm I at stage 1, given the input price,
ݓ ை , charged by firm I, the profits of firms 1 and 2 at stage 4 are as follows:
ߨଵ
ை = (1 − ݍଵை − ݍଶை − ߣݓ ை)ݍଵை ߨଶை = (1 − ݍଵை − ݍଶை − ݓ ை)ݍଶை .
The superscript ܱ donates the situation of outsourcing.
8 As other equilibrium outcomes for ܯ ܽݔቂ0, ଶௗିଵ
ఒ
ቃ< ܿ< ܯ ܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ have no impact on the rest of the
analysis, we do not consider them.
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We can get the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 as:
ݍଵ
ை = ଵା(ଵିଶఒ)௪ ೀ
ଷ
ݍଶ
ை = ଵି(ଶିఒ)௪ ೀ
ଷ
.
Firm I faces demand from both firms 1 and 2, and it is equal to ߣݍଵை + ݍଶை =
ఒ ଵൣା(ଵିଶఒ)௪ ೀ൧ାଵି(ଶିఒ)௪ ೀ
ଷ
. At stage 3, firm I sets its input price ݓ ை to maximize profit ߨூை ,
i.e., max
௪ ೀ
ߨூ
ை = max
௪ ೀ
൫௪ ೀିௗ൯൛ఒ ଵൣା(ଵିଶఒ)௪ ೀ൧ାଵି(ଶିఒ)௪ ೀൟ
ଷ
.
We get the equilibrium input price as ݓ ை = ଵାఒାଶௗ൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯
ସ(ଵିఒାఒమ) .
Standard calculation shows that the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2, the equilibrium
profits of the firms and the equilibrium consumer surplus under outsourcing are respectively:
ݍଵ
ை = ହିହఒାଶఒమାଶௗ(ଵିଶఒ)൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯
ଵଶ(ଵିఒାఒమ) ݍଶை = ଶିହఒାହఒమିଶௗ(ଶିఒ)൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯ଵଶ(ଵିఒାఒమ)
ߨଵ
ை = ହൣିହఒାଶఒమାଶௗ(ଵିଶఒ)൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯൧మ
ଵସସ(ଵିఒାఒమ)మ ߨଶை = ଶൣିହఒାହఒమିଶௗ(ଶିఒ)൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯൧మଵସସ(ଵିఒାఒమ)మ
ߨூ
ை = ଵൣାఒିଶௗ൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯൧మ
ଶସ(ଵିఒାఒమ) ܥܵை = ଻ൣିଵ଴ఒା଻ఒమିଶௗ(ଵାఒ)൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯൧మଶ଼ (଼ଵିఒାఒమ)మ .
Social welfare under outsourcing is
ܹ ை = ߨଵை + ߨଶை + ߨூை + ܥܵை =
ଵଵଽି ଶ଺଼ఒାଷ଻଼ఒమିଶ଺଼ఒయାଵଵଽఒరିସௗ൫ଵ଻ିଵସఒାଵ଻ఒమାଵ଻ఒయିଵସఒరାଵ଻ఒఱ൯ାସௗమ൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯
మ
൫ଶଷିଶ଺ఒାଶଷఒమ൯
ଶ଼ (଼ଵିఒାఒమ)మ .
2.3. Outsourcing decision
At stage 1, firm 1 compares its profit under outsourcing and under in-house production to
decide its strategy of input production.
We have seen in subsection 2.1.2 that, if firm 1 produces the input in-house, it has no
incentive to compete with firm I in the input market if the input market is characterized by
Cournot competition, or if the input market is characterized by Bertrand competition and
12
ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ≤ ܿ< ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃ. However, it has the incentive to compete with firm I in
the input market if the input market is characterized by Bertrand competition and
ܯܽݔቂ0, ଶௗିଵ
ఒ
ቃ< ܿ< ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ.
If the input market is characterized by Cournot competition, or if the input market is
characterized by Bertrand competition and ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ≤ ܿ< ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃ , by
comparing firm 1’s profit under outsourcing (ߨଵை ) and under in-house production with no
selling of input ( ߨଵெ ), we get ߨଵெ ⋛ ߨଵை if ܿ⋚ ǁܿ, where ǁܿ= ଷఒାସௗ൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯଻(ଵିఒାఒమ) and
ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ< ǁܿ< ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃ. 9 If the input market is characterized by Bertrand
competition and ܯܽݔቂ0, ଶௗିଵ
ఒ
ቃ< ܿ< ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
ቃ, by comparing firm 1’s profit under
outsourcing (ߨଵை ) and under in-house production with Bertrand competition in the input
market (ߨଵ஻), we get that ߨଵ஻ > ߨଵை , as ߨଵ஻ > ߨଵெ and ߨଵெ > ߨଵை since ܯܽݔቂ0, ଵସௗିଷଵ଺ିହఒቃ< ǁܿ
holds. Therefore, firm 1 prefers to produce the inputs in-house for ܯܽݔቂ0, ଶௗିଵ
ఒ
ቃ< ܿ≤ ǁܿ
under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition in the input market.
Under the constraint of A2, ǁܿ< ݀ may be satisfied, i.e., ǁܿmay be less than ݀ if 0 <
ߣ< ଶ
଻
, i.e., if the efficiency of firm 1 in processing input to the final good is sufficiently high
to that of firm 2. In other words, firm 1 may prefer outsourcing to in-house production even
if its marginal cost of input production is lower than that of the outside input supplier.
We get the following proposition immediately from the above analysis.
9 ଵସௗିଷ
ଵ଺ିହఒ
< ǁܿ can be rearranged as d < ଷ൫଻ାଽఒାଶఒమ൯
ଶ(ଵ଻ି଻ఒା଻ఒమାଵ଴ఒయ) which holds under the assumption A2 because of
ଶିହఒାହఒమ
ଶ(ଶିఒ)(ଵିఒାఒమ) < ଷ൫଻ାଽఒାଶఒమ൯ଶ(ଵ଻ି଻ఒା଻ఒమାଵ଴ఒయ) , i.e., 4(1 − ߣ)(1 − ߣ+ ߣଶ)(4 + 53ߣ+ 28ߣଶ) > 0 . ǁܿ< 1 can be
rearranged as 4(1 − ݀)(1 − ߣ+ ߣଶ) + 3(1 − ߣ)ଶ > 0 which holds always, while ǁܿ< ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
can be
rearranged as (2 + 2݀− 4݀ߣ)(1 − ߣ+ ߣଶ) + 3(1 − ߣ) > 0 which holds always.
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Proposition 1: If firm 1’s marginal cost of in-house input production is high (low), i.e. ܿ>(≤) ǁܿ, it prefers outsourcing (in-house production) of its inputs. Firm 1 may prefer outsourcing
even for ݀ > (ܿ> ǁܿ) if 0 < ߣ< ଶ
଻
, i.e., if firm 1’s efficiency in processing input to the final
good is sufficiently high to that of firm 2.
The intuition for proposition 1 is as follows. The change from in-house production to
outsourcing by firm 1 increases the demand for input faced by the outside input supplier,
which leads to a higher input price set by the outside input supplier, i.e., ݓ ை > ݓ ெ . In other
words, this increases firm 2’s marginal cost of production by ݓ ை − ݓ ெ = ఒ[ଵି௖ା(ଵିఒ)(ଵାఒ௖)]
ସ(ଵିఒାఒమ) .
The increase in rival’s cost of production has a beneficial effect on firm 1’s profit.
Fig 1. The equilibrium input production decision of firm 1
As Fig 1 shows, if outsourcing allows firm 1 to access a cheaper way of production, i.e.
ܿ> ݓ ை , which occurs for ܿ> Ǎܿ, where Ǎܿ= ଵାఒାଶௗ൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯
ସ(ଵିఒାఒమ) = ݓ ை and ǁܿ< Ǎܿ<
ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃ,10 outsourcing makes firm 1 better off.
10 ǁܿ< Ǎܿcan be rearranged as ݀ < ଻ିହఒ
ଶ(ଵିఒାఒమ) which holds always under the assumption A2 while Ǎܿ<
ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ
଻ఒ
ቃ will follow from the next footnote.
ܿ
ܯܽݔ൤0, 2݀− 1
ߣ
൨ ܯ ݅݊ ൤1, 5 + 2݀7ߣ ൨ܿ̃ ܿ̆
ܿ< ݓ ை
OutsourcingIn-house
ܿ> ݓ ை
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For ǁܿ< ܿ< Ǎܿ, even though the outside input price under outsourcing is higher than that
of firm 1’s in-house input cost, firm 1 still has the incentive to outsource its input production
to the outside input supplier because outsourcing increases firm 1’s marginal cost of
production by ߣ( Ǎܿ− )ܿ, which is much less than the increase in firm 2’s marginal cost of
production. The lower the value of ߣ, the less is the adverse effect on firm 1 due to a higher
marginal cost under outsourcing, and the adverse effect created by a higher own marginal cost
of production is less than the beneficial effect created by the rival’s higher marginal cost
production. In other words, although outsourcing increases the marginal cost of firm 1, the
raising rival’s cost strategy creates the rationale for outsourcing by firm 1 for ǁܿ< ܿ< Ǎܿ.
If ܿ< ǁܿ, the input-production technology of firm 1 is sufficiently efficient and the in-
house input production by firm 1 outweighs its above-mentioned benefit from outsourcing.
Hence, firm 1 prefers in-house input production compared to outsourcing for ܿ< ǁܿ.
2.4. Welfare analysis
2.4.1. Consumer surplus
Comparing consumer surplus under outsourcing with that of under in-house production by
firm 1 for ܿ> ǁܿ, we get that ܥܵை < ܥܵெ for ǁܿ< ܿ< Ƹܿas shown in Fig 2, where Ƹܿ=
ଷାଶௗ൫ଵିఒାఒమ൯
ହ(ଵିఒାఒమ) and Ǎܿ< Ƹܿ< ܯ ݅݊ ቂ1, ହାଶௗ଻ఒ ቃ.11 We know from subsection 2.3 that, for ǁܿ< ܿ<
Ǎܿ, outsourcing by firm 1 not only increases the marginal cost of firm 2 but also increases its
11 Ǎܿ< Ƹܿcan be rearranged as ݀ < ଻ିହఒ
ଶ(ଵିఒାఒమ) which holds always under the assumption A2. Ƹܿ< 1 can be
rearranged as ݀ < ଶିହఒାହఒమ
ଶ(ଵିఒାఒమ) which holds always under the assumption A2, while Ƹܿ< ହାଶௗ଻ఒ can be rearranged
as (4 + 10݀− 14݀ߣ)(1 − ߣ+ ߣଶ) + 21(1 − ߣ)ଶ > 0 which holds always.
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own marginal cost of production. For Ǎܿ< ܿ< Ƹܿ, although outsourcing reduces firm 1’s
marginal cost of production, that reduction is less than the increase in firm 2’s marginal cost
of production. Hence, if ǁܿ< ܿ< Ƹܿ, outsourcing by firm 1 increases the total marginal cost of
final goods production compared to in-house production by firm 1. Since consumer surplus is
positively related to total final goods production, which is negatively related to the total
marginal costs of firms 1 and 2, if ǁܿ< ܿ< Ƹܿ, outsourcing (compared to in-house input
production) by firm 1 reduces consumer surplus.
If Ƹܿ< ,ܿ the reduction in firm 1’s marginal cost of production due to outsourcing is more
than the increase in firm 2’s marginal cost of production. In this situation, outsourcing
increases consumer surplus compared to in-house input production by firm 1.
Fig 2. The effect of outsourcing on consumer surplus
The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion.
Proposition 2: Outsourcing by firm 1 makes the consumers worse (better) off compared to in-
house input production by firm 1 for ǁܿ< ܿ< Ƹܿ( Ƹܿ< )ܿ.
ܿ
ܯܽݔ൤0, 2݀− 1
ߣ
൨ ܯ ݅݊ ൤1, 5 + 2݀7ߣ ൨ܿ̃ ܿ̂ܿ̆
OutsourcingIn-house
ܥܵை > ܥܵெܥܵை < ܥܵெ
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2.4.2. Social welfare
Now we consider the effect of outsourcing on social welfare which consists of the profits of
all firms and consumer surplus. From the above-mentioned analysis, we know that
outsourcing increases the profits of firm 1 and firm I but reduces the profit of firm 2 and may
reduce consumer surplus.
Comparing social welfare under outsourcing ( ܹ ை ) with that of under in-house
production (ܹ ெ ) by firm 1 for ܿ> ǁܿ, we get that ܹ ை < ܹ ெ for ܿ∈ ( ǁܿ, ҧܿ) which would
not be empty if the following two conditions hold:
(1) 0 < ߣ< ߣଵ
(2) ݀ < ݀̅
where
ҧܿ= ଼ହାହ଼ௗିඨ(଼ହାହ଼ௗ)మାଵଷଵହ଺ఒమௗమିଶ଼଺ఒ(ଵହାସ଴ௗାହଶௗమ)ି భమఴళഊమ൫భషഊశഊమ൯మିఴఱఴഊమ(ఱశర೏షఱഊషమ೏ഊ)భషഊశഊమ
ଵସଷఒ
,
݀̅ = ቐ ଶିହఒାହఒమଶ(ଶିఒ)(ଵିఒାఒమ) , for 0 < ߣ≤ ߣ଴
଻଴ାଷହఒିଵ଺଻ఒమି଼ସ(ଵିఒ)√ିଵ଴ାଶ଻ఒିଵ଺ఒమ
ଶ(ଵହସିଵ଼ହఒ)(ଵିఒାఒమ) , forߣ଴ < ߣ< ߣଵ , ߣ଴ ≈ 0.557639 and ߣଵ ≈0.632226. Under conditions (1) and (2), we have ҧܿ< Ǎܿ.12
The welfare comparison is shown in the following diagram.
12 Under the condition of 0 < ߣ< ߣଵ , ܿҧ< Ǎܿwill hold if 4(184 − 225λ)(1 − λ + λଶ)ଶ݀ଶ− 4(136 −
279λ + 204λଶ− 68λଷ − 75λସ)݀− (200 + 193λ − 766λଶ + 537λଷ) < 0 or
ଵଷ଺ିଵସଷ஛ି଻ହ஛మିସ଼ඥଶସିଶଵ஛ି଼଴஛మାଵଶ଻஛యିହ଴஛ర
ଶ(ଵ଼ସିଶଶହ஛)(ଵି஛ା஛మ) < ݀ < ଵଷ଺ିଵସଷ஛ି଻ହ஛మାସ଼ඥଶସିଶଵ஛ି଼଴஛మାଵଶ଻஛యିହ଴஛రଶ(ଵ଼ସିଶଶହ஛)(ଵି஛ା஛మ) . Thus, we can get
ҧܿ< Ǎܿ under the conditions of 0 < ߣ< ߣଵ and ݀ < ݀̅ because ଻଴ାଷହఒିଵ଺଻ఒమି଼ସ(ଵିఒ)ඥିଵ଴ାଶ଻ఒିଵ଺ఒమଶ(ଵହସିଵ଼ହఒ)(ଵିఒାఒమ) <
ଶିହ஛ାହ஛మ
ଶ(ଶି஛)(ଵି஛ା஛మ) for ߣ଴ < ߣ< ߣଵ , and ଶିହ஛ାହ஛మଶ(ଶି஛)(ଵି஛ା஛మ) < ଵଷ଺ିଵସଷ஛ି଻ହ஛మାସ଼ඥଶସିଶଵ஛ି଼଴஛మାଵଶ଻஛యିହ଴஛రଶ(ଵ଼ସିଶଶହ஛)(ଵି஛ା஛మ) and
ଵଷ଺ିଵସଷ஛ି଻ହ஛మିସ଼ඥଶସିଶଵ஛ି଼଴஛మାଵଶ଻஛యିହ଴஛ర
ଶ(ଵ଼ସିଶଶହ஛)(ଵି஛ା஛మ) < 0 for ߣ< ߣଵ.
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Fig 3. The effect of outsourcing on social welfare under the conditions (1) and (2)
The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion.
Proposition 3: If the marginal cost of the outside input supplier is not high (݀ < ݀̅) and the
efficiency of firm 1 in processing input to the final good is significantly higher compared to
firm 2 (0 < ߣ< ߣଵ), outsourcing decreases social welfare compared to in-house production
for ǁܿ< ܿ< ҧܿ. Otherwise, outsourcing increases social welfare compared to in-house input
production by firm 1.
Outsourcing occurs in our analysis for ܿ> ǁܿ. However, we observe two scenarios with
respect to the outsourcing decision: (i) the firm 1 doing outsourcing pays the input price that
is lower than its cost of in-house input production, which happens for Ǎܿ< ,ܿ and (ii) the firm
1 doing outsourcing obtains a strategic advantage in the final goods market even though the
input price paid by firm 1 is higher than its in-house cost production, which happens for ǁܿ<
ܿ< Ǎܿ.
First note that the welfare under outsourcing remains constant for all .ܿ Since outsourcing
ܿ
ܯܽݔ൤0, 2݀− 1
ߣ
൨ ܯ ݅݊ ൤1, 5 + 2݀7ߣ ൨ܿ̃ ܿ̂ܿ̅ ܿ̆
ܹ ை < ܹ ெ ܹ ை > ܹ ெ
OutsourcingIn-house
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reduces the input cost of firm 1 for Ǎܿ< ,ܿ it increases social welfare compared to in-house
input production due to the production-efficiency gain from outsourcing.
If ǁܿ< ܿ< Ǎܿ, outsourcing increases firm 1’s per-unit input cost compared to its in-house
input production. If the marginal cost of the outside input supplier is not high (݀ < ݀̅) and the
efficiency of firm 1 in processing input to the final good is significantly higher to that of firm
2 (0 < ߣ< ߣଵ), outsourcing happens, and increases the input price for firm 2 and the input
cost for firm 1 significantly compared to firm 1’s in-house input production when ܿ is
marginally higher than ǁܿ. As a result of these two efficiency gains under firm 1’s in-house
input production, social welfare is higher under in-house production than under outsourcing.
As ܿ increases, social welfare under in-house production decreases. At ܿ= Ǎܿ, the input price
under outsourcing and firm 1’s in-house cost of input production are the same. However, in
this situation, firm I has a more efficient production technology than firm 1. Hence,
outsourcing helps to save the cost of input production and creates higher welfare compared to
in-house input production by firm 1. Now by continuity, at ܿ= ҧܿ, we have the same welfare
under outsourcing and in-house input production by firm 1. Hence, for ܿ> ҧܿ, the welfare
under outsourcing is higher than under in-house input production by firm 1, and for ǁܿ< ܿ<
ҧܿ, the welfare under outsourcing is lower than under in-house input production by firm 1.
3. The welfare implications of innovation
Now we can consider the implications of innovation by firm 1. Suppose firm 1 has the option
to reduce either its in-house input cost, i.e., ,ܿ or the input coefficient in the final good
production, i.e., ߣ, by investing in innovation prior to the outsourcing decision.
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There is no doubt that both innovation to reduce the cost of in-house input production and
innovation to reduce the input coefficient in the final good of firm 1 will definitely benefit
consumers and the social welfare if they don’t change firm 1’s input production strategy.
However, it follows from Proposition 1 that a reduction in ߣ increases the possibility of
outsourcing by reducing the value of ǁܿ, whereas a reduction in ܿ increases the possibility in-
house production by firm 1.
Since ܥܵெ is decreasing with ,ܿ ܥܵை is independent of ܿ and ܥܵை < ܥܵெ at ǁܿ, it
can be inferred from Proposition 2 that a reduction in ܿ will increase consumer surplus when
it induces firm 1 to change its strategy from outsourcing to in-house input production, which
happens if ܿ reduces, say, from ଴ܿ to ଵܿ and ଴ܿ < ǁܿ< ଵܿ. However, although a reduction
in ߣ increases consumer surplus under outsourcing, it may make the consumers worse off if
it induces firm 1 to change its strategy from in-house input production to outsourcing.13 Thus,
investment in innovation to reduce the cost of in-house input production and to reduce input
coefficient may have different effect on consumer surplus.
Next, consider the effect of innovation on social welfare. Ignoring the constraint A2, we
can get that at ܿ= ǁܿ, ܹ ை ⋛ ܹ ெ for ߣ⋛ ̅ߣ, where the values of ̅ߣ varying with ݀ are
shown in Fig 4. The left (right) part of curve ݀ = ଶିହఒାହఒమ
ଶ(ଶିఒ)(ଵିఒାఒమ) is the area where the
combinations of ݀ and ߣ are (not) under consideration in this paper. Thus, the dotted part
of curve ̅ߣ(݀) is the situation where the values of ̅ߣ(݀) are contradicted with the constraint
A2.
13 This may happen since a lower ߣ reduces c and increases the rage of c over which outsourcing occurs.
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Fig 4. The value of ̅ߣ which varies with ݀
We get that the social welfare under outsourcing is always higher than that of under in-
house input production by firm 1 for ǁܿ< ܿ when ߣ> ̅ߣ holds. However, as Proposition 3
shows, social welfare under outsourcing is lower compared to in-house production by firm 1
for ǁܿ< ܿ< ҧܿwhen ߣ< ̅ߣ holds.14 Therefore, since ܹ ெ is decreasing with ܿ and ܹ ை
is independent of ,ܿ if ܿ reduces, say, from ଴ܿ to ଵܿ, such that ଴ܿ < ǁܿ< ଵܿ, it will increase
(may decrease) social welfare if it induces firm 1 to change its strategy from outsourcing to
in-house input production for ߣ< (>)̅ߣ.
Similarly, although a reduction in ߣ increases social welfare under outsourcing, it may
decrease (increase) social welfare if it induces firm 1 to change its strategy from in-house
input production to outsourcing.15
To sum up, in the presence of outsourcing, innovation to reduce the cost of in-house input
14 Note that ߣଵ = ̅ߣ(݀ = 0).
15 This may happen since a lower ߣ reduces ǁܿ and increases the rage of ܿ over which outsourcing occurs.
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production and innovation to reduce the input coefficient in the final good of firm 1 may create
significantly different effects on the consumers and the society.
4. Conclusion
We provide a new strategic rationale for outsourcing in this paper. We show that although a
firm possesses a superior input-production technology, it may still have the incentive for
outsourcing if it has significantly higher efficiency in processing input to the final good
compared to its rival. This effect was hitherto not recognized in the literature. We also show
that outsourcing may make the consumers as well as the society worse off by raising the input
price charged by the independent input supplier. Thus, it justifies recent concern about the
welfare effects of outsourcing.
We further discuss the welfare implications of innovation by the firm doing outsourcing.
We show that, in the presence of outsourcing, innovation to reduce the cost of in-house input
production and innovation to reduce the input coefficient in the final goods production may
have significantly different implications for the consumers and the society.
We have considered in our analysis that firm 1 has a better technology to produce the
final goods compared to firm 2. However, there could be another interpretation of our
analysis following Arya et al. (2008).16 Instead of considering firms 1 and 2 having different
technologies to produce the final goods, one can consider a model where the independent
intermediate input supplier charges Firm 1 a ߣ fraction of the price charged to Firm 2. Even
if firms 1 and 2 have the same production technologies for the final goods, the independent
16 We thank an anonymous referee for this alternative interpretation.
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input supplier charges asymmetric input prices in this way to induce outsourcing by firm 1
(i.e., playing “favoritism” in the terminology of Arya et al., 2008), which allows the
independent input supplier to earn higher profits compared to the situation where firm 1 does
not outsource. The restriction of ߣ< ଶ
଻
shown in Proposition 1 suggests that, under this
alternative interpretation, the independent supplier may charge firm 1 an input price that is
2
7
of the input price charged to firm 2. However, this is altogether a separate exercise
regarding the optimality of such a discriminatory pricing in the given context.
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